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Abstract
We discuss two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution in
the context of an object division problem involving two agents. Allocations of objects
resulting from strategic interaction are obtained as a demand vector in a specific mar-
ket. For the first support result games in strategic form are derived that exhibit a
unique Nash equilibrium. The second result uses subgame perfect equilibria of a game
in extensive form. Although there may be multiple equilibria, coordination problems
can be removed.
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1 Introduction
The task to obtain a non-cooperative foundation for a cooperative solution concept is widely
described by the term Nash program. Starting with an underlying cooperative game, one
needs to derive a non-cooperative game in normal or extensive form in such a way that
equilibrium payoffs coincide with (or belong to) the cooperative solution. In this paper, we
want to support the Kalai-Smorodinsky (hereafter KS) bargaining solution2 in this spirit.
In effect, the bargaining solution can as well be obtained by strategic interaction instead of
signing an agreement. Clearly, one is interested in formulating a universal way to derive the
non-cooperative game, which means that one should not make use of particular knowledge
of the underlying bargaining problem.
1I thank Walter Trockel for valuable comments. Financial support from the project “Fairness und An-
reize”, FiF-Projekt, Bielefeld University is gratefully acknowledged.
2see Kalai & Smorodinsky (1975).
Apparently, there are striking similarities between the Nash program and the theory of im-
plementation, although the foci are slightly different. However, Trockel (2002) shows that
for solutions concepts from cooperative game theory, a support result as discussed above can
be “transformed” into an implementation result in the spirit of implementation theory (see
also Serrano (1997), Dagan & Serrano (1998) and Bergin & Duggan (1999)). This is the
content of the so-called embedding lemma. In particular, any support result for a bargaining
solution readily yields an implementation result for this solution as well.
Roughly, there are two ways, in which we could think about supporting a bargaining solu-
tion. One way is to follow a purely welfaristic approach, which means that one only considers
the possible allocations of utility provided in the bargaining situation and takes this set (to-
gether with the status quo point) as the primitives of the cooperative model. Along this line,
Trockel (1999) discusses support results for a class of bargaining solutions including the KS
solution (cf. also Haake (2000)).
In the second direction, there is an additional entity considered in the model; a set of
outcomes. This set may, for example, consist of allocations of goods or (lotteries over) alter-
natives. A bargaining problem is induced by evaluation of outcomes with individual utility
functions. Therefore, supporting a bargaining solution in such a setup means achieving a
certain outcome through strategic interaction, the utility of which coincides with the given
bargaining solution. Such a non-welfaristic approach can cure an important drawback: In
practice it is not necessarily clear, how a specific utility allocation is actually obtained,
whereas it appears to be a much simpler task to select a certain (physical) outcome. In
a seminal paper, Moulin (1984) discusses an implementation of the KS solution, using a
mechanism, in which “fractions of dictatorship are auctioned off”. The winning bid in the
auction later constitutes a probability distribution on the set of (physical) alternatives, so
that the KS solution is the expected payoff from this lottery. In a similar spirit, Miyagawa
(2002) obtains a subgame-perfect implementation result for a class of bargaining solutions
including the KS solution.
As Moulin’s (1984) work does, we follow the second approach. We investigate an object
division problem, in which a finite number of (divisible) objects may be distributed among
two agents. Our approach differs from Moulin’s in two respects. First, we obtain an ex-
act support result in the sense that deterministic payoffs in equilibrium coincide with the
KS solution. And second, instead of using an auction mechanism, we set up an exchange
market. Payoffs (in equilibrium) are the result of individual demand. Roughly speaking, a
strategy choice in the supporting games determines prices and income, that in turn yield
utility maximizing allocations of objects.
We present two support results in the paper: First, we derive from any object division prob-
lem a non-cooperative game in strategic form, which has a unique Nash equilibrium. This
game gives rise to a second game in extensive form. There the payoff in any subgame per-
fect equilibrium coincides with the KS solution. Although we cannot guarantee uniqueness
of equilibria, no coordination problem occurs, as the resulting outcomes are (essentially)
unique.
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2 Notation and Framework
We investigate a market, in which finitely many objects are distributed among two agents.
Let I = {1, 2} denote the set of agents and N := {1, . . . , n} the set of objects. There is
exactly one unit of each object in the market. Denote by e := (1, . . . , 1) ∈ Rn the vec-
tor of total endowments. We assume that objects are divisible, so that an allocation (of
objects) is described by a pair x = (x1, x2) ∈ [0, 1]n × [0, 1]n satisfying x1 + x2 ≤ e. We
denote the set of allocations by A. Neither agent is initially endowed with some object.
We assume that agents’ preferences are linear over divisions of an object and additively
separable across objects. That means, agent i’s preferences may be represented by a vector
ui = (ui1, . . . , u
i
n) >> 0.
3 The quantity uij may be interpreted as agent i’s willingness to
pay for object j. Agent i’s utilities over bundles are given by a function U i : [0, 1]n −→ R,
defined by U i(xi) :=
∑
j∈N x
i
j · u
i
j (i ∈ I). By U , we denote the set of all pairs of utility
functions (U 1, U 2) as above. For presentational reasons we will assume that for each pair in
U the corresponding utility vectors u1, u2 satisfy u1j/u
2
j > u
1
j+1/u
2
j+1 for all j = 1, . . . , n− 1,
which means in particular that no two objects exhibit the same rate of substitution between
the two agents. To sum, we describe a market by a tuple M = (I,N, U) with U ∈ U .
In the sequel, we want to achieve allocations by letting agents demand objects according to
specific income and prices. A price system is a vector p ∈ Rn+. For given price system p
and income level m ∈ R+, we define the budget set B(m, p) := {y ∈ [0, 1]
n | p y ≤ m} and
for i ∈ I agent i’s demand correspondence Di(m, p) := argmax {U i(y) | y ∈ B(m, p)}. In the
remainder, we make use of two specific price systems. Due to our assumption that utility
functions are representable by a vector ui ∈ Rn++, we may also view u
i as a linear function to
evaluate (bundles of) objects; hence, we may view ui as a specific price system. Throughout
the paper, we set p¯i := ui (i ∈ I).
Any market (I,N, U) induces a two person bargaining game in the following way. The
set of feasible utility allocations is given by V U := compH({U 1(y1), U 2(y2) ∈ R2 | y ∈ A}).4
Status quo utilities are (always) given by the origin 0 ∈ R2 and so we identify the
game with its utility possibility set V U . It is easy to see that V U can be written as a
sum of utility possibility sets; one for each object separately, i.e. V U =
∑
j∈N V
U
j with
V Uj := compH(
{
λ(u1j , 0) + (1− λ)(0, u
2
j) | 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1
}
). Hence, the class V :=
{
V U |U ∈ U
}
of bargaining games generated by an object division problem is the class of games with com-
pactly generated, polyhedral utility possibility sets. For U ∈ U define M i = M i,U
i
:= U i(e).
M i reflects agent i’s maximal possible utility in V U . The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining
solution is the mapping K : V −→ R2 that takes each V U to its unique Pareto optimal
utility allocation, in which both agents obtain the same fraction of their maximal utility,
i.e. K1(V U)/M1,U = K2(V U)/M2,U =: τ(V U).
We close with some important observation on the demand correspondence. Define a
parametrization h = hU : [0, 1] −→ R2 of the Pareto boundary of V U through h(δ) :=
(t¯(δ), δ ·M 2), with t¯(δ) := max
{
t ∈ R | (t, δ ·M 2) ∈ V U
}
. That means, to each δ ∈ [0, 1] the
point h(δ) is the unique Pareto efficient point in V U , in which agent 2 receives a δ share of
his maximal utility. As one easily sees, hU1 is a concave, strictly decreasing function. In the
3We use the following notation for vector inequalities in Rn: x >> y means xj > yj(j ∈ N); x > y means
xj ≥ yj(j ∈ N) and x 6= y; x ≥ y means x > y or x = y.
4Here compH(·) denotes the comprehensive hull operator.
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following lemma we show that certain demand sets Di(m, p) are singletons. In such cases
we will identify the set with its single element.
Lemma 1. Let M = (I,N, U) be a market satisfying the above assumptions.
1. For i ∈ I and m ∈ [0,M 3−i], the demand set Di(m, p¯3−i) is a singleton.
2. To each Pareto optimal utility allocation (v1, v2) ∈ V U there exists a unique (Pareto
optimal) allocation (z1, z2) ∈ A with U i(zi) = vi. Clearly, z1 + z2 = e.
3. Any Pareto optimal allocation a = (a1, a2) has the form a1 = (1, . . . , 1, λ, 0, . . . , 0), a2 =
(0, . . . , 0, 1− λ, 1, . . . , 1) with a1 + a2 = e.
4. U i(e−D3−i(m, p¯i)) = M i −m holds for i ∈ I and m ∈ [0,M i].
5. For m ∈ [0,M 1] we have U 1(D1(m, p¯2)) = h1(1−
m
M2
).
Proof:
1) First note that for a price system p, Di(m, p) is obtained as follows. Order the objects
according to their utility/price ratio, i.e. uij/pj. Then agent i first demands the object
with the highest ratio, then the one with the second highest a.s.o. until his budget m is
used up. For p = p¯3−i = u3−i this means, we order the objects according to uij/u
3−i
j ,
i.e. according to their substitution rates. With our assumptions that objects are already
ordered in this way and different objects have different substitution rates, we conclude that
D1(m, p¯2) consists of a unique vector of the form (1, . . . , 1, λ, 0, . . . , 0) and D2(m, p¯1) is of
the form (0, . . . , 0, µ, 1, . . . , 1) with λ, µ ∈ [0, 1].
2) This immediately follows from our assumption that substitution rates are different across
objects. Therefore, to any allocation z of objects, the utility allocation of which is Pareto
optimal in V U , there does not exist a redistribution of z, so that every agent is equally well
off.
3) Note that any Pareto efficient utility allocation v ∈ V U =
∑
j∈N V
U
j can be uniquely
written as the sum of utility allocations in V Uj , i.e. v =
∑
j vj. All utility allocations vj as
well as v have to exhibit the same normal vector of a supporting hyperplane and, with our
assumption on different substitution rates, it follows that for all but at most one j we have
either vj = (u
1
j , 0) or vj = (0, u
2
j). So, all but at most one object are completely allocated to
some agent. With the assumption on the order of objects according to substitution rates,
we conclude that the allocation of objects corresponding to v takes the asserted form.
4) We prove the case i=1. Let z2 :=D2(m, p¯1). At price system p¯1 we have u1j/p¯
1
j = 1 for all
j ∈ N . Hence, D1(m′, p¯1) = {x ∈ [0, 1]n | p¯1 x = m′} collects all bundles, the worth of which
under p¯1 is exactly m′. Since z2 ∈ B(m, p¯1) (and preferences are strictly monotonic), we
know that p¯1 z2 = m, hence p¯1 (e − z2) = M 1 −m and therefore e − z2 ∈ D1(M1 −m, p¯1).
Note that (e− z2, z2) is a Pareto efficient allocation, since agent 2 maximizes his utility on
the budget set and agent i can only be better off, when obtaining a higher income than
M1 −m.5 Therefore U 1(e− z2) = M 1 −m.
5) With part 4, we obtain U 2(e−D1(m, p¯2))=M 2−m = (1− m
M2
) M2 and since (D1(m, p¯2), e−
D1(m, p¯2)) is Pareto efficient, we conclude U 1(D1(m, p¯2)) = h1(1−
m
M2
).
Note that as a consequence of part 1 of the lemma, we can conclude Di(m, p¯3−i) ≥
Di(m′, p¯3−i) (vector inequality), if m ≥ m′.
5In fact, the pair (p¯1; (e−z2, z2)) constitutes a Walrasian equilibrium of the underlying economy w.r.t. to
the given income distribution. See Haake (2004) for further details.
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3 Support Results
Achieving a support result for a bargaining solution means executing the following task: One
has to derive from each bargaining game V U a non-cooperative game ΓU , so that payoffs in
equilibrium coincide with the bargaining solution applied to the bargaining game at hand.
The “rules” for deriving such a game should thereby not make use of knowledge about the
underlying bargaining problem, but rather describe how Γ is derived in general. Clearly, the
“strength” of a support result is connected to the strength of the equilibrium concept that
is used.
In this section, we will discuss two support results for the KS solution in the present context.
First we describe rules for deriving a game in strategic form having exactly one Nash equi-
librium. The equilibrium payoff coincides with the KS solution of the underlying bargaining
game. Second, we derive a game in extensive form, which has multiple subgame perfect
equilibria. However, there are no coordination problems involved, as all equilibria have s the
same payoff; again the KS solution.
Payoffs in both games, respectively the final allocations of objects, are achieved by endowing
agents with a specific amount of money and letting them demand objects at prices p¯1 or p¯2.
3.1 Unique Nash equilibrium support
For U ∈ U we construct a game ΓU = (S1, S2, F 1, F 2) as follows: Strategy spaces are
S1 = S2 = [0, 1]. For any pair of strategies γ = (γ1, γ2) ∈ S1 × S2, we first determine an
allocation g(γ) = (g1(γ), g2(γ)) ∈ A of objects as follows:
(g1) Determine for i ∈ I agent i’s demand at income level (1 − γ3−i) · M 3−i, at prices
p¯3−i = u3−1, i.e. determine xi(γ) := Di((1− γ3−i) ·M 3−i, p¯3−i).
Set zi(γ) := e− x3−i(γ). If z1(γ) + z2(γ) ≤ e holds, then define g(γ) := (z1(γ), z2(γ)).
(g2) Otherwise (z1(γ) + z2(γ) 6≤ e), determine zˆi(γ) := Di((1− γi) ·M 3−i, p¯3−i) and set
gi(γ) :=
{
zi(γ) , if zi(γ) + (e− zˆi(γ)) ≤ e
zˆi(γ) , otherwise.
Payoffs in ΓU are given by evaluation of the resulting allocation, i.e. F i(γ) = U i(gi(γ)) (i∈I).
Theorem 1. For each U ∈U the game ΓU has a unique Nash equilibrium γ¯. This is given
by γ¯1 = γ¯2 = τ(V U). Furthermore, F (γ¯) = K(V U).
Proof: Fix U ∈ U and set τ := τ(V U), hence we examine γ¯ = (τ, τ).
Step 1: Note first, that g(γ¯) is determined according to (g1). With part 4 of Lemma 1,
we know U i(zi(γ¯)) = U i(e − D3−i((1 − τ)M 3−i, p¯3−i)) = τM i (i = 1, 2) and hence
(U 1(z1(γ¯)), U 2(e − z1(γ¯))) = K(V U) = (U 1(e − z2(γ¯)), U 2(z2(γ¯))), which implies z1(γ¯) =
e− z2(γ¯). Therefore g(γ¯) = (z1(γ¯), z2(γ¯)) and F i(gi(γ¯)) = K i(V U) (i∈I).
Step 2: Next, we show that γ¯ is a Nash equilibrium in ΓU . Suppose agent 1 deviates to σ1 < τ .
Since e−D2((1− τ) ·M 1, p¯1) ≥ e−D2((1−σ1) ·M 1, p¯1) holds6, the function g is still deter-
mined according to (g1) and hence F 1(σ1, τ) = U 1(g1(σ1, τ)) ≤ U 1(g1(τ, τ)) = F 1(σ1, τ).
6Use part 1 of Lemma 1 and the fact that demand is increasing in income.
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If agent 1 deviates to ρ1 > τ , we conclude that g is determined by (g2). Suppose
z1(ρ1, τ) + (e− zˆ1(ρ1, τ)) ≤ e were true. Then (z1(ρ1, τ), e− zˆ1(ρ1, τ)) ∈ A is a feasible allo-
cation. Using Lemma 1 we compute its utility allocation (U 1(z1(ρ1, τ)), U 2(e− zˆ1(ρ1, τ))) =
(ρ1M1, τM2) > (τM 1, τM2) = K(V U), which contradicts Pareto efficiency of the KS solu-
tion. It follows again with part 5 of Lemma 1 that F 1(ρ1, τ) = U 1(zˆ1(ρ1, τ)) = hU1 (ρ
1) <
hU1 (τ) = τM
1 = F 1(γ¯) has to hold. Analogous arguments apply for agent 2.
Step 3: Step 2 shows that agent i can assure himself a payoff of τM i by choosing γ¯i = τ .
Therefore, the payoff in any other equilibrium has to be at least this amount for both agents.
But the only utility allocation in V U that does satisfy this condition is K(V U). It is then
immediate that γ¯ is the only strategy profile with payoff K(V U) and therefore the only Nash
equilibrium in ΓU .
3.2 Subgame Perfect support
Next, we derive an extensive form game ΣU from a bargaining game V U ∈ V . Again, we
first obtain an allocation as the result of strategy choices. The rules are as follows:
Stage 1 Agent 1 selects η ∈ [0, 1].
Stage 2 Agent 2 is entitled to either choose a bundle z2 = z2(η) ∈ B((1− η)M 1, p¯1) or to
pass to the next stage. In the former case, the final allocation is (e−z2, z2)∈A.
Stage 3 Agent 1 is entitled to choose a bundle z1 = z1(η) ∈ B((1 − η)M 2, p¯2). The final
allocation is (z1, e− z1)∈A.
Again, payoffs in ΣU are determined by evaluation of the final allocation with U i(·).
Theorem 2. Let z¯ = (z¯1, z¯2) be the final allocation and η¯ be the chosen parameter at Stage 1
in a subgame-perfect equilibrium of ΣU . Then we have η¯ = τ(V U) and (U 1(z¯1), U 2(z¯2)) =
K(V U).
Proof:
First, in any subgame perfect equilibrium, if either agent 2 or 1 chooses a bundle from the
budget set (at stage 2 or 3), he will choose z2 = D2((1−η)M 1, p¯1) or z1 = D1((1−η)M 2, p¯2),
respectively. By parts 4 and 5 of Lemma 1, we know that U 1(e−z2) = η·M 1 and U 2(e−z1) =
η ·M2, which means U 1(z1) = hU1 (η).
At stage 2, agent 2 compares his payoff from choosing z2 himself with U 2(e − z1), which
he anticipates when passing to the next round. Since the respective allocations (e − z2, z2)
and (z1, e − z1) are Pareto efficient, we have that U 2(z2) > U 2(e − z1), if and only if
U1(e− z2) < U 1(z1). so agent 2 takes his decision as to minimize agent 1’s payoff.
Therefore, at stage 1, agent 1 faces a payoff of min(U 1(z1), U 1(e− z2)) = min(hU1 (η), ηM
1).
To maximize this expression, agent 1 chooses η¯ to equate hU1 (η¯) = η¯M
1.7 Hence, hU(η¯) =
(η¯M 1, η¯M 2), so η¯ = τ(V U) and the equilibrium payoff coincides with K(V U).
Note that in equilibrium agent 2 is indifferent between choosing himself or letting agent 1
choose at stage 3. Nonetheless, there is no coordination problem at all, since with the unique
equilibrium parameter η¯ = τ(V U) the resulting allocations yield the same payoffs. With our
assumption on different substitution rates, agent 1 and 2 will even choose the same allocation
of objects.
7Recall that hU
1
(η) is decreasing in η.
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4 Discussion and Further Results
Although the game ΓU is a one-shot game, we may think of payoff functions as to be deter-
mined in several steps. First, according to strategy choice γ i ∈ [0, 1] of agent i, agent 3− i
is equipped with an income of (1 − γi)M3−i, thus with a 1 − γi share of the value of the
total object set under prices p¯3−i. Next, agent 3 − i selects a bundle w.r.t. his income and
leaves the remaining objects to agent i (the bundle zi(γ) in (g1)). Assuming that 3− i chose
the utility maximizing bundle, we have U i(zi(γ)) = γiM i. But this will be the final payoff,
only if the two bundles z1(γ), z2(γ) constitute a feasible allocation. In this sense, we check
compatibility of γ1 and γ2. Intuitively, on the one hand a “higher” γi proposes a higher util-
ity, but on the other hand makes it less likely that the we have a feasible allocation in (g1).
Now, what happens, if (z1(γ), z2(γ)) fails to be an allocation? Then we examine each γ i once
again. Now agent i himself will be endowed with a (1−γ i) share of M 3−i and is supposed to
choose a utility maximizing bundle (this is zˆi(γ)). Observe that U 3−i(e − zˆi(γ)) = γiM3−i.
According to (g2), agent i still obtains z1(γ), only if it is possible to provide a γi share of
total utilities to both agents (in that case (z1(γ), e− zˆ1(γ)) is feasible). But, if γi is so “high”
that this would not be possible, then agent i gets away with zˆi(γ), i.e., the bundle chosen
w.r.t. a “low” income.
Whereas we assumed utility maximizing choice in ΓU , we let agents freely choose in ΣU .
But, since the bundle chosen by either agent 2 or 1 is the final bundle for that agent, utility
maximizing prevails in any subgame perfect equilibrium. Inspecting the decision to be taken
by agent 2 at stage 2 reveals that he has to decide between two (Pareto efficient) allocations.
Suppose, η was chosen at stage 1. Then either agent 1 obtains an η share of his maximal
utility (which is the case, if agent 2 chooses himself), or agent 2 passes and obtains ηM 2
(agent 1 chooses at stage 3). As in ΓU a “high” η can backfire for agent 1, as agent 2 may
pass to stage 3, where agent 1 is endowed with a “low” income of (1 − η)M 2. Conversely,
a “low” η gives incentives for agent 2 to choose himself at stage 2 with a “high” income.
In effect, there remains a “max-min problem” for agent 1 as this is also incorporated in the
definition of the KS solution. This kind of tradeoff was also observed by Trockel (2000) in a
welfaristic context.
We should add a note on the role of prices. Although one can formally show that the two
price systems p¯i (i ∈ I) constitute Walrasian equilibrium prices8, we shall not regard them
as competitive prices. Put in other words, these prices shall not be viewed as being formed
under perfect competition, but result from application of the (normative) solution concept
of Walrasian equilibrium. Therefore, we rather use equilibrium prices as an instrument to
achieve certain allocations. So, price taking is not understood as a consequence of perfect
competition but belongs to the rules of the game.
Both games ΓU and ΣU satisfy a property that was termed full range property by Trockel
(2000). This means that the rules of the game allow for any feasible allocation in A as the
outcome of the game, or, put in other words, any utility allocation V U is attainable as payoff
from strategic interaction. So, by playing the game instead of signing an agreement, the
agents do not lose any of their allocation possibilities. For example, in ΓU a high γ1 can be
compatible with a “low” γ2, so that a high payoff for agent 1 is (in principle) possible.
Observe that the assumption of ordered and mutually different substitution rates does not
8see Haake (2004) for details.
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constitute a material restriction. In case there are different objects having the same substi-
tution rate, we lose the one-to-one correspondence between Pareto efficient utility and object
allocations. Moreover, the demand sets in part 1 of Lemma 1 are no longer singletons. How-
ever, we will always be able to select an appropriate allocation, the utility allocation of which
satisfies required properties.
The reader may dislike that there are two different price systems involved to obtain payoffs.
As Haake (2004) shows the price system p¯ with p¯j = (u
1
j ·u
2
j)
1/2 is always an equilibrium price
system and therefore individual demand leads to an efficient allocation. As it is basically
shown there, we get support results for the superadditive bargaining solution introduced
by Perles & Maschler (1981). If one replaces p¯i by p¯ in ΓU (ΣU), the results go through
with K(V U) replaced by the PM solution. The equilibrium strategies in ΓU are given by
γ¯ = (1/2, 1/2) as well as η¯ = 1/2 in ΣU .
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